II – Conteúdo
1. Por que não realismo metafísico, realismo interno nem relativismo cognitivo?
2. Percepção direta, relatividade conceitual e pluralismo conceitual.
3. Compreensão, verdade e de justificação.
4. Realismo natural e a explicação do sucesso da ciência.
III - Métodos Utilizados
Aulas expositivas, discussão de textos e problemas.
IV – Atividades Discentes
Leitura dos textos centrais de cada aula e participação nas discussões.
V – Critérios de Avaliação Participação
Presença em pelo menos 80% das aulas.
VI – Bibliografia
AUXIER, Randall E.; ANDERSON, Douglas R.; HAHN, Lewis E. (Eds.) (2015) The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam. Chicago: Open Court.
BAGHRAMIAN, Maria (ed.) (2012) Reading Putnam. London: Routledge.
BEN-MENAHEM, Yemima (ed.) (2005) Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CASE, Jennifer, "On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy XXXV, 1 (Spring 1997), 1-18
CASE, Jennifer, The heart of Putnam's pluralistic realism. In: Revue internationale de philosophie, 4/2001 (n° 218), p. 417-430.
CONANT, James; ZEGLEN, Urszula M. (eds.) (2002) Hilary Putnam: pragmatism and realism. London, New York: Routledge.
CLARK, Peter; HALE, Bob (eds.) (1994) Reading Putnam. Oxford: Blackwell.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1975a) “The meaning of ‘meaning’”. In: H. Putnam (1975) Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical papers vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 215-271.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1975b) Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical papers vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 215-271.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1976) Realism and reason. In: H. Putnam (1978) Meaning and the moral science. Boston/London/Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul. p. 123-138.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1978a) Meaning and the moral science. Boston/London/Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1978b) Models and reality. In: H. Putnam (1983) Realism and reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1-25.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1981) Reason, truth and history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1983) Realism and Reason. Philosophical papers vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1987) The many faces of realism. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1990) Realism with a human face. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
PUTNAM, H. (1991) Does the disquotational theory of truth solve all philosophical problems? In: H. Putnam; J. Conant (ed.) (1995) Words and life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 264-278.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1992) Renewing philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1994) The Dewey Lectures 1994 – Sense, nonsense, and the senses: an inquiry into the powers of the human mind”. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 91.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1995) Pragmatism: an open question. Cambridge: Blackwell.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1999) The threefold cord: mind, body and world. Nova York: Columbia University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2001) Reply to Jennifer Case. In: Revue internationale de philosophie, 2001/4 (n° 218), p. 431-438.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2004a) Ethics without ontology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2004b) Sosa on internal realism and conceptual relativity In: John Greco (ed.) (2004) Ernest Sosa: And His Critics. Malden: Blackwell, 237-248.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2012a) Philosophy in an age of science: physics, mathematics, and skepticism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2012b) Sensation and apperception. In: Miguens; Preyer (eds.) (2012) Consciousness and Subjectivity. Berlin: Ontos Verlag, 39-50.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2015a) Intellectual autobiography of Hilary Putnam. In: AUXIER, Randall E.; ANDERSON, Douglas R.; HAHN, Lewis E. (Eds.) (2015) The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam. Chicago: Open Court. p. 3-110.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2015b) Reply to Yemima Ben-Menahem. In: AUXIER, Randall E.; ANDERSON, Douglas R.; HAHN, Lewis E. (Eds.) (2015) The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam. Chicago: Open Court. p. 481-485.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2015c) Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity. Association In: Journal of the American Philosophical Association / Volume 1 (02), p. 312-328.
1. Por que não realismo metafísico, realismo interno nem relativismo cognitivo?
2. Percepção direta, relatividade conceitual e pluralismo conceitual.
3. Compreensão, verdade e de justificação.
4. Realismo natural e a explicação do sucesso da ciência.
III - Métodos Utilizados
Aulas expositivas, discussão de textos e problemas.
IV – Atividades Discentes
Leitura dos textos centrais de cada aula e participação nas discussões.
V – Critérios de Avaliação Participação
Presença em pelo menos 80% das aulas.
VI – Bibliografia
AUXIER, Randall E.; ANDERSON, Douglas R.; HAHN, Lewis E. (Eds.) (2015) The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam. Chicago: Open Court.
BAGHRAMIAN, Maria (ed.) (2012) Reading Putnam. London: Routledge.
BEN-MENAHEM, Yemima (ed.) (2005) Hilary Putnam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
CASE, Jennifer, "On the Right Idea of a Conceptual Scheme”. In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy XXXV, 1 (Spring 1997), 1-18
CASE, Jennifer, The heart of Putnam's pluralistic realism. In: Revue internationale de philosophie, 4/2001 (n° 218), p. 417-430.
CONANT, James; ZEGLEN, Urszula M. (eds.) (2002) Hilary Putnam: pragmatism and realism. London, New York: Routledge.
CLARK, Peter; HALE, Bob (eds.) (1994) Reading Putnam. Oxford: Blackwell.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1975a) “The meaning of ‘meaning’”. In: H. Putnam (1975) Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical papers vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 215-271.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1975b) Mind, Language and Reality. Philosophical papers vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 215-271.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1976) Realism and reason. In: H. Putnam (1978) Meaning and the moral science. Boston/London/Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul. p. 123-138.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1978a) Meaning and the moral science. Boston/London/Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1978b) Models and reality. In: H. Putnam (1983) Realism and reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1-25.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1981) Reason, truth and history. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1983) Realism and Reason. Philosophical papers vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1987) The many faces of realism. La Salle, IL: Open Court.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1990) Realism with a human face. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
PUTNAM, H. (1991) Does the disquotational theory of truth solve all philosophical problems? In: H. Putnam; J. Conant (ed.) (1995) Words and life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 264-278.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1992) Renewing philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1994) The Dewey Lectures 1994 – Sense, nonsense, and the senses: an inquiry into the powers of the human mind”. The Journal of Philosophy, v. 91.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1995) Pragmatism: an open question. Cambridge: Blackwell.
PUTNAM, Hilary (1999) The threefold cord: mind, body and world. Nova York: Columbia University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2001) Reply to Jennifer Case. In: Revue internationale de philosophie, 2001/4 (n° 218), p. 431-438.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2004a) Ethics without ontology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2004b) Sosa on internal realism and conceptual relativity In: John Greco (ed.) (2004) Ernest Sosa: And His Critics. Malden: Blackwell, 237-248.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2012a) Philosophy in an age of science: physics, mathematics, and skepticism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2012b) Sensation and apperception. In: Miguens; Preyer (eds.) (2012) Consciousness and Subjectivity. Berlin: Ontos Verlag, 39-50.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2015a) Intellectual autobiography of Hilary Putnam. In: AUXIER, Randall E.; ANDERSON, Douglas R.; HAHN, Lewis E. (Eds.) (2015) The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam. Chicago: Open Court. p. 3-110.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2015b) Reply to Yemima Ben-Menahem. In: AUXIER, Randall E.; ANDERSON, Douglas R.; HAHN, Lewis E. (Eds.) (2015) The Philosophy of Hilary Putnam. Chicago: Open Court. p. 481-485.
PUTNAM, Hilary (2015c) Naturalism, Realism, and Normativity. Association In: Journal of the American Philosophical Association / Volume 1 (02), p. 312-328.
.png)
